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ABSTRACT 
 
This study finds that ownership concentration has a positive impact on R&D investments up 
to a critical point, after which the impact is reversed. Further, the study indicates that family 
control has a moderating effect on the nonlinear relationship between ownership 
concentration and R&D investments. More specifically, family-controlled firms are 
influenced by ownership concentration to a lower extent than non-family controlled firms. 
Consistent with most prior studies, this study shows that shareholders of a family-controlled 
firm are involved in the long-term decisions of the firm, and may thus invest in R&D 
innovation to seek long-term profit maximization in certain situations. 
 
Keywords: Ownership concentration; R&D investments; Family control; Moderating effect; 
Excess control 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The effect of ownership is particularly interesting in the context of research and development 
(R&D) investments, given that “R&D was causing efficient firm scale to increase to the point 
where no individual, family, or group of managers would have sufficient wealth to own a 
controlling interest in major firms” (Holderness, 2014). This study examines the relationship 
between ownership concentration and R&D investments as well as the moderating effect of 
family control on the relationship. Prior studies (Chen, Li, Shapiro, & Zhang, 2014; Zhang, 
Li, Hitt, & Cui, 2007) document that ownership structure is related to a firm’s R&D 
activities. Chang, Chung, and Mahmood (2006) and Baysinger, Kosnik, and Turk (1991), in 
particular, claim that shareholders with concentrated ownership prefer to make long-term 
R&D investments to increase the stability of the firm rather than seek short-term profit 
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maximization. Similarly, Lee and O'neill (2003) find that ownership concentration in US 
firms is positively correlated with R&D investments. 
 
Consistent with this argument, our empirical results indicate that R&D investments increase 
with ownership concentration up to a critical point, after which the relationship turns 
negative. The former observation confirms that blockholders’ decision making in a 
concentrated ownership firm may be long-term oriented, which may encourage shareholders 
to make more R&D investments. The latter observation indicates that once a mass of 
blockholders’ wealth is concentrated in a specific firm, the blockholders with highly 
concentrated ownership become risk averse (Dilling-Hansen, Madsen, & Smith, 2003) and 
are reluctant to spend on R&D investments. This finding is consistent with Cho (1998), who 
shows that a nonlinear relationship exists between insider ownership and R&D investments. 
 
Prior studies on family-controlled companies argue that the preference to employ family 
members to hold positions as directors, supervisors and/or managers causes these firms to 
lose expertise, particularly in terms of R&D technologies. Such nepotism is common in 
family-controlled firms because family members own a majority of the shares (Tsai, Hung, 
Kuo, & Kuo, 2006) which allows them to act for their own benefit or at the cost of other 
shareholders’ interests (Chu, 2009). Thus, family control in firms may result in less R&D 
investments (Choi, Zahra, Yoshikawa, & Han, 2015). However, Hamadi and Heinen (2015) 
document that family members would be associated with the firm for generations and their 
decisions regarding the firm would be long-term oriented. These confounding findings imply 
that family members may vary from one firm to another. Besides, the uniqueness of family-
controlled companies in pursuing corporate goals also indicate that family-controlled 
companies are more heterogeneous as compared to non-family controlled firms. This study 
thus calls this intuition into question by examining the relationship between ownership 
concentration and R&D investments. 
 
Taking family control as a moderator, we find a nonlinear, inverted U-shaped relationship 
between ownership concentration and R&D investments for non-family controlled firms. 
However, the potential impact of ownership concentration on R&D investments can be 
observed only minimally in family-controlled firms, suggesting that shareholders in family-
controlled firms aim for long-term profit maximization (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Schulze, 
Lubatkin, & Dino, 2003). More specifically, the findings indicate that family-controlled firms 
may have higher R&D investments as compared to non-family controlled firms, when 
ownership concentration is at an extremely low level or at an extremely high level. These 
results are in line with the findings of the study by Jaggi, Leung, and Gul (2009) that family 
control is a moderating element on the relationship between board independence and earnings 
management. In addition, Lo, Ting, Kweh, and Yang (2016) document the moderating role of 
family control on the relationship between ownership structure and financial leverage. 
 
This study makes at least two contributions. First, rather than assuming that shareholders with 
a concentrated ownership deal with R&D investments in a linear way (Chang et al., 2006), 
this study empirically suggests a nonlinear relationship between ownership concentration and 
R&D investments; this relationship is particularly obvious in non-family firms. This study 
highlights the existence of risk aversion when ownership of a firm is highly concentrated in 
some blockholders. 
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Second, this study clarifies the difference in R&D investments between family-controlled 
firms and non-family controlled firms. Our finding is consistent with the study by Hamadi 
and Heinen (2015), which indicates that there is no effect of ownership concentration on the 
performance of family-controlled firms. In contrast to prior studies (Choi et al., 2015), we 
prove that family-controlled firms may not always be reluctant to spend on R&D investments 
as compared to other types of companies. While family owners are conservative and risk 
averse (Schulze et al., 2003), they aim for long-term profit maximization and thus, would be 
willing to spend on R&D investments (Chang et al., 2006). 
 
The following sections are organized as follows. The next part dicusses prior studies and 
develops hypotheses. The third part explains data and methodology, while the following one 
covers tests and results. The final part concludes this study. 
 
 
PRIOR STUDIES AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
Empirical studies on the ownership concentration-R&D relationship produce mixed results. 
Ortega-Argiles and Moreno (2009) agree that ownership concentration has a significantly 
negative relationship to R&D as the action of the managers in risky decisions are limited, 
thereby moving the firm away from the benefits of specialization. Consistently, Zeng and Lin 
(2011) suggest that firms with concentrated share ownership and inside ownership have lower 
R&D spending but state ownership has higher level of R&D spending for Chinese listed 
firms. This is due to the fact that state ownership provides incentives to closely monitor 
management and pursue long term goals, thus reducing agency cost and promotes R&D 
spending. Moreover, Karray and Kriaa (2009) indicate that ownership structure especially 
foreign controlled firms have a significant negative impact on R&D investment. State and 
foreign controlled firms are said to have less probability and motivation to innovate. While 
the former is subjected to bureaucracy and lack of communication that subsequently reduced 
the innovative incentives, the latter are motivated by weak cost of labour and often 
subcontracting to produce innovation. In contrast, Lee (2012) found that there is a positive 
effect of ownership concentration on R&D for the sample of 424 Korean manufacturing firms 
from 1999-2008. 
 
The prediction about the overall effect of ownership on the R&D of a firm is unclear. 
Therefore, this study attempts to further investigate this relationship in Taiwan. We 
hypothesize the following: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Ownership concentration is significantly related to R&D. 
 
Despite the vital role that family businesses plays in the economy, little is known about how 
family ownership affects R&D of the firms. Hence, this papers makes the first attempt to test 
the moderating effect of family control on the relationship between ownership concentration 
and R&D. In other word, the study further establishes the fact that family ownership identity 
plays a significant role in determining the R&D, given the concentrated ownership which is 
lacking in literature. 
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DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
This study employs a large panel dataset comprising data related to firms that are publicly 
listed on Taiwan Stock Exchange for the period from 1999 to 2014. The data were extracted 
from the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) database. The following criteria were applied to 
filter the data: first, the total assets of each observation must be at least NTD 1 billion to 
prevent the small firm effect; second, the observations must not have a missing value for any 
variable in our empirical models; third, the sample must not include financial institutions 
because they have different statutory requirements. The final sample, thus derived, in this 
study comprised 15,721 firm-year observations for analyses. 
 
The following paragraphs describe the methodology used for the empirical analyses in this 
study. Specifically, we followed the tradition of empirical studies to examine the relationship 
between R&D investments and ownership concentration using regression analysis. Consistent 
with prior studies (for an example, Hovey, Li, & Naughton, 2003), two main measures were 
used to examine the impact of ownership concentration on R&D investments, OC3 and OC5, 
which represent the respective percentages of shares held by the top three (OC3) and top five 
(OC5) blockholders. To control for potential industrial differences and intertemporal effects, 
we subtracted OC3 (OC5) from the median OC3 (OC5) of the firm’s corresponding industry 
in that year. Further, we added the value 1 to the industry-adjusted ownership concentration 
to prevent any negative ratio because the squared terms of both OC3 and OC5 have been used 
in our regression models. 
 
For family control, a dummy variable that represents a firm controlled by a group of people 
who have a family relationship or share a common family name was used, following Lo et al. 
(2016). Based on the strict definition given by the TEJ, family-controlled firms are those in 
which (i) the positions of chairman and chief executive officer are held by family members; 
(ii) board seating rights are greater than 50 percent and outside directors are less than 33 
percent of the total number of directors; (iii) board control rights are at least 33 percent and at 
least three family members hold positions as directors, supervisors and/or managers; and (iv) 
the block shareholdings held by the family shareholder(s) are more than the critical control 
level1. Finally, the dependent variable, R&D, was measured as R&D expenditures relative to 
total assets, in line with prior studies (Gavious, Hirsh, & Kaufman, 2015; Zeng & Lin, 2011). 
 
To minimize the possible effect of endogeneity on ownership concentration (Chen, Cheung, 
Stouraitis, & Wong, 2005; Lee & O'neill, 2003), we used the two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
method to examine the relationship among ownership concentration, family control and R&D 
investments. At the first stage, this study regressed either OC3 or OC5 on family control, 
board-related features and firm-related features. At the second stage, this study utilized the 
predicted values of OC3 and OC5 as the testing variable of the ownership concentration. 
Therefore, the following equations were drawn up: 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8 9 , ,           
it it it it it it it it
it it s s it u u it it
s u
OC FamC MB Vol FDir IDir Size Age
ROA CR Year Industry
       
    
       
       (1a) 
                                                          
1 Critical control level is “the critical portion of shares which, if it is held as the largest bloc, has a certain degree 
of control, which is high enough for it to be said to dominate the company” (Cubbin & Leech, 1983, p. 358). 
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8 9 10 11 , ,
& it it it it it it it it
it it it it s s it u u it it
s u
R D OC FamC IDir Size Age ROA Profit
               LTDR CapI InvI CR Year Industry
       
      
       
         (1b) 
 
where R&D is the ratio of R&D to total assets; OC can be either OC3, which is Top 3 
ownership percentage or OC5, which is Top 5 ownership percentage; FamC is family control; 
MB is the ratio of market value to book value of equity; Vol is σROAt in the industry; FDir  is 
the ratio of foreign directors to total directors; IDir is the ratio of independent directors to 
total directors; Size is the natural logarithm of total assets; Age is the natural logarithm of 
years of establishment; ROA is the ratio of earnings before interests and taxes to prior-year 
total assets; Profit is the ratio of continuing operations’ income after taxes to total sales; 
LTDR is the ratio of long term debt to total assets; CapI is the ratio of fixed assets to total 
assets; InvI is the ratio of inventory to total assets; and CR is the ratio of current assets to 
current liabilities. The control variables are included based on prior studies including Chen et 
al. (2014), Zhang et al. (2007), Chang et al. (2006), Baysinger et al. (1991), and Lee and 
O'neill (2003). 
 
To examine the moderating effect of family control on the relationship between ownership 
concentration and R&D investments, we include an interaction term of OC and FamC. 
Specifically, we estimate the following equation: 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
7 8 9 10 11 12
, ,
& it it it it it it it
it it it it it it
s s it u u it it
s u
R D OC FamC OC FamC IDir Size Age
               ROA Profit LTDR CapI InvI CR
               Year Industry
      
     
  
       
     
   
 (2) 
 
 
TESTS AND RESULTS 
 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables of our sample. The table 
shows that R&D investments account for nearly 2 percent of the sample firms’ total assets. 
The means and medians of OC3 and OC5 are close to one, reflecting that they are industry-
adjusted indicators. Mean family control (FamC) indicates that around 62 percent of the 
sample firms are family-controlled. The average market to book (MB) ratio of the sample 
firms is 157 percent, while the mean volatility (Vol) is 0.11. In terms of board composition, 
the proportion of foreign and independent directors on the board is approximately 2 percent 
and 14 percent, respectively. The average firm size (Size) is 8.64 (logged value), indicating 
average total assets of approximately NTD 5.653 billion. The average logged value of 3.09 
for years of establishment (Age) shows that the sample firms have been in business for 22 
years. With respect to return on assets (ROA), the reported mean value is 0.07. Mean Profit 
indicates that the total income after taxes from continuing operations of the sample firms is 3 
percent on average. The average total long-term debt to total assets ratio (LTDR) for the 
observed period is around 11 per cent. Furthermore, around 30 percent and 17 percent of the 
sample firms’ total assets are made up of fixed assets (CapI) and inventories (InvI), 
respectively. The average current ratio (CR) of 2.50 suggests that NTD 1 of the sample firms’ 
current liabilities is covered by NTD 2.50 of their current assets. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics (N = 14,573) 
 
Variable Mean Median Q1 Q3 S.D. 
R&D/total assets (R&D) 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.03 
Top 3 ownership percentage (OC3) 1.02 1.00 0.90 1.13 0.17 
Top 5 ownership percentage (OC5) 1.02 1.00 0.90 1.12 0.16 
Family control (FamC) 0.62 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.48 
Market value/book value of equity (MB) 1.57 1.21 0.80 1.88 1.41 
σROAt in the industry (Vol) 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.13 0.04 
Foreign directors/total directors (FDir) 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 
Independent directors/total directors (IDir) 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.29 0.17 
Natural logarithm of total assets (Size) 8.64 8.39 7.69 9.27 1.27 
Natural logarithm of years of establishment (Age) 3.09 3.18 2.75 3.53 0.58 
Net income/total assets (ROA) 0.07 0.06 0.02 0.12 0.12 
Continuing operations’ income after taxes 
(Profit) 
0.03 0.04 0.01 0.10 2.67 
Long term debt/total assets (LTDR) 0.11 0.08 0.02 0.17 0.11 
Fixed assets/total assets (CapI) 0.30 0.29 0.16 0.43 0.19 
Inventory/total assets (InvI) 0.17 0.14 0.08 0.21 0.15 
Current assets/current liabilities (CR) 2.50 1.73 1.29 2.53 5.20 
Note: OC3 is Top 3 ownership relative to total outstanding shares, which is defined as OC3 subtracts median 
OC3 of the industry plus one to avoid having any negative values. OC5 is Top 5 ownership relative to total 
outstanding shares, which is defined as OC5 subtracts median OC5 of the industry plus one to avoid having any 
negative values. FamC = A dummy variable equals one if company i is family-controlled, and zero otherwise. 
 
In Table 2, all the observations of the study have been grouped in two categories, based on 
family control and the level of R&D investments. The findings indicate that family-controlled 
firms have significantly lower R&D and MB ratio compared to those of non-family controlled 
firms (0.0163 vs. 0.0311 and 1.4600 vs. 1.7119, respectively). Morck and Yeung (2003) 
claim that family-controlled firms prefer to maintain their control on firms, which may 
conflict with focusing on R&D investments. Morck and Yeung (2004) further emphasize that 
family owners are not well-equipped with advanced or complex technology, suggesting that 
new development or changes may be perceived as a threat by them. These findings 
corroborate the findings of Sirmon, Arregle, Hitt, and Webb (2008), Chen and Hsu (2009) 
and Muñoz-Bullón and Sanchez-Bueno (2011) who agree that family-controlled firms and 
R&D investments are significantly and negatively related. Because owner-managers have a 
strong preference for control (Goffee & Scase, 1985), family-controlled firms may entail 
higher ownership concentration to maintain their decision-making authority in the firm.  
 
Furthermore, a firm is more likely to be a non-family controlled firm in the groups of higher 
volatility, higher proportion of foreign directors and independent directors, higher ROA and 
current ratio. The mean difference tests also indicate that family-controlled firms are 
significantly larger in firm size, older in terms of firm age, and more profitable; further, they 
have more fixed assets and inventories over total assets compared to non-family controlled 
firms. Overall, most of the differences are statistically significant at the conventional levels. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FGIC 1st Conference on Governance & Integrity, 2017  
“Innovation & Sustainability Through Governance”  
3 – 4 April 2017, Yayasan Pahang, Kuantan, Malaysia 
ISBN 978-967-2054-37-5 
 
100 
 
Table 2: Sub-group analysis 
 
 Grouping by FamC  Grouping by R&D_Dum 
Variable Family Non-Family Difference t-stat  High Low Difference t-stat 
R&D 0.0163 0.0311 -0.0149 -26.04***      
OC3 1.0414 0.9885 0.0529 19.34***  1.0160 1.0275 -0.0116 -4.21*** 
OC5 1.0367 0.9889 0.0478 17.67***  1.0136 1.0242 -0.0107 -3.93*** 
MB 1.4600 1.7119 -0.2519 -10.90***  1.7713 1.3925 0.3788 16.31*** 
Vol 0.1016 0.1135 -0.0119 -18.51***  0.1083 0.1049 0.0033 5.16*** 
FDir 0.0129 0.0252 -0.0123 -10.26***  0.0207 0.0155 0.0052 4.24*** 
IDir 0.1189 0.1670 -0.0482 -17.53***  0.1594 0.1256 0.0338 12.17*** 
Size 8.6861 8.6131 0.0730 3.48***  8.5670 8.7033 -0.1364 -6.48*** 
Age 3.2064 2.9351 0.2712 28.96***  3.0362 3.1451 -0.1089 -11.36*** 
ROA 0.0633 0.0766 -0.0133 -6.90***  0.0581 0.0420 0.0160 8.97*** 
Profit 0.0388 0.0161 0.0226 0.53  0.0404 0.0229 0.0175 0.39*** 
LTDR 0.1244 0.0967 0.0277 14.77***  0.0965 0.1244 -0.0278 -15.10*** 
CapI 0.3249 0.2706 0.0544 17.52***  0.2886 0.3147 -0.0261 -8.44*** 
InvI 0.1705 0.1596 0.0110 4.43***  0.1565 0.1802 -0.0237 -9.64*** 
CR 2.3251 2.6685 -0.3434 -4.12***  2.6082 2.4056 0.2026 2.35** 
Note: Refer to Table 1 for the definitions of the variables. ** and *** denote the significance levels at 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
With respect to the comparison based on R&D levels, a firm with higher R&D investments is 
more likely to have a higher MB ratio, greater volatility, higher proportion of foreign 
directors and independent directors, larger ROA, greater profitability and higher current ratio, 
of which the mean differences tests are all significant at the conventional levels. Conversely, 
this univariate analysis reveals that firms with low R&D investments have significantly 
higher ownership concentration compared to that of firms with high R&D investments. In 
addition, firms with low R&D investments tend to have significantly larger firm size, higher 
firm age, higher fixed assets to total assets, and more inventories over total assets than firms 
with high R&D investments. 
 
As stated earlier, this study adopts the two-stage least squares (2SLS) method to address the 
endogeneity issue with respect to the relationship between ownership concentration and R&D 
investments. Panel A of Table 3 reports the 2SLS regression results using OC3 as the 
dependent variable at stage 1 and R&D as the dependent variable at stage 2. At stage 1, this 
study regresses ownership concentration on family control and additional variables. The 
empirical evidence at stage 1 depicts a significantly positive relationship between family 
control and ownership concentration. This result is consistent with Lo et al. (2016), asserting 
that ownership concentration and family control are simultaneously influenced by one 
another. 
 
At stage 2, the empirical findings show that ownership concentration positively influences 
R&D investments. This result is consistent with Lee (2012) who argues that shareholders 
with concentrated ownership are usually long term-oriented because their profits depend on 
the firm’s long-term survival. More specifically, blockholders have incentives to spend on 
R&D investments. 
 
This study further examines the moderating effect of family control on the relationship 
between ownership concentration and R&D investments. A significant moderating effect of 
family control exists in the link between ownership concentration and R&D investments, 
whereby the coefficient on OC3 x FamC is -0.0968. Interestingly, the positive coefficient on 
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OC3 (0.0740) and the negative interaction variable (-0.0968) suggest that the slope for family 
control is close to zero. The untabulated F-test that examines the net effect of family control 
confirms the result at the conventional 5 percent significance level. Overall, this finding 
indicates that the effect of family control on R&D investments is less influenced by 
ownership concentration.  
 
Further, this study uses squared OC3 to test a possible nonlinear relationship between 
ownership concentration and R&D investments. The positive coefficient on OC3 (0.5303) 
and the negative coefficient on OC32 (-0.2163) conclude that a nonlinear relationship exists 
between ownership concentration and R&D investments. The results imply that at a low level 
of ownership concentration, as ownership concentration increases, blockholders are willing to 
spend more on R&D investments. However, after a critical point, blockholders with more 
ownership concentration invest in R&D on a decreasing curve owing to their risk aversion.  
 
Another interesting result was found regarding the effect of moderating coefficients on OC3 x 
FamC and OC32 x FamC, being significantly negative (-0.6179) and significantly positive 
(0.2518), respectively. Again, the results demonstrate the moderating role of family control, 
where FamC moderates the non-linear relationship between ownership concentration and 
R&D investments. The untabulated F-test indicates the net values of OC3 and OC3 x FamC 
are approximately zero (F-statistics = 0.18). A consistent result was obtained for the net 
values of OC32 and OC32 x FamC (F-statistics = 0.14). These results indicate that the 
relationship between ownership concentration and R&D investments is represented by an 
inverted U-shaped curve for non-family controlled firms; however, the effect is minimal for 
family-controlled firms. More specifically, while R&D investments of non-family controlled 
firms are influenced by ownership concentration, the effect of ownership concentration is less 
pronounced among family-controlled firms. These results suggest that R&D investments in 
family-controlled firms are higher than those in other firms on average in two scenarios—
when the ownership concentration is at a low level and when the ownership concentration at 
a high level.  
 
Following Lean, Ting, and Kweh (2015), Ehikioya (2009), and S. Lee (2012), we use OC5 as 
an alternative measure of ownership concentration. The estimations are shown in Panel B of 
Table 3, and the results are qualitatively similar to those in Panel A of Table 3. 
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Table 3: 2SLS regression results – ownership concentration (N = 14,573) 
 
Panel A: Ownership concentration = OC3 
Dependent 
Variable 
Stage 1: OC3  
Stage 2: R&D 
Variable Estimate t-stat  Estimate t-stat  Estimate t-stat  Estimate t-stat 
Intercept 1.0995  67.88***  0.1075  13.84***  -0.0114 -0.96  -0.2529  -3.02*** 
OC3    0.0362  3.81***  0.0740  7.01***  0.5303  3.41*** 
OC3xFamC       -0.0968  -8.12***  -0.6179  -2.74*** 
OC32          -0.2163  -2.95*** 
OC32xFamC          0.2518  2.37** 
FamC 0.0695  24.98***  -0.0086 -10.43***  0.0906  7.40***  0.3586  3.00*** 
MB 0.0058  5.40***          
Vol 0.3485  19.30***          
FDir -0.0476  -0.79          
IDir -0.0132  -12.48***   -0.0015  -6.61***  -0.0009  -3.73***  -0.0007  -2.49** 
Size -0.0189  -6.83***  -0.0096  -18.01***  -0.0075  -13.06***  -0.0072  -12.25*** 
Age 0.0787  6.33***  -0.0001  -0.04  -0.0063  -2.58***  -0.0079  -3.17*** 
ROA 0.0003  0.62  -0.0002  -1.77  -0.0002  -1.73*  -0.0002  -1.77* 
Profit    -0.0238  -8.97***  -0.0231  -8.74***  -0.0228  -8.57*** 
LTDR    -0.0279  -16.71***  -0.0259  -15.55***  -0.0261  -15.66*** 
CapI    -0.0170  -7.29***  -0.0155  -6.67***  -0.0157  -6.74*** 
InvI    0.0002  3.40***  0.0002  3.28***  0.0002  3.34*** 
CR 0.0710  7.61***  0.0111  6.01***  0.0070  3.61***  0.0059  2.87*** 
Fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj. R2 0.0858  0.2441  0.2530  0.2534 
        
Panel B: Ownership concentration = OC5 
Dependent 
variable 
Step 1: OC5  
Step 2: R&D 
Variable Estimate t-stat  Estimate t-stat  Estimate t-stat  Estimate t-stat 
Intercept 1.1262 70.68***  0.0172  1.55  -0.0127  -1.08  -0.1967  -2.65*** 
OC5    0.0409  4.46***  0.0733  7.24***  0.4207  3.06*** 
OC5×FamC       -0.0827  -7.47***  -0.5374  -2.80*** 
OC52          -0.1646  -2.55** 
OC52×FamC          0.2190  2.41** 
FamC 0.0643 23.46***  -0.0087 -11.26***  0.0758 6.69***  0.3105 3.07*** 
Control Variables Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj. Rsq. 0.0932  0.2500  0.2508  0.2531 
Note: Refer to Table 1 for the definitions of the variables. *, **, and *** denote the significance levels at 10%, 
5% and 1%, respectively. Fixed effects include year and industry. 
 
Although ownership concentration is widely used in existing studies to measure the level of 
concentrated ownership, for ensuring the robustness of the test, this study further employs 
excess control (EC) as another proxy of ownership concentration (Cubbin & Leech, 1983). 
Higher excess control implies a higher level of ownership concentration, and owners with a 
significant amount of shareholding may take aggressive actions over managerial decisions. 
According to Lee (2012), excess control is calculated as the difference between ownership 
controlled by the ultimate controlling shareholders and the critical level of ownership that 
ensures the retention of controlling rights.2 We calculate ownership as the sum of the 
percentage of direct and indirect shares held by the ultimate controlling shareholders. This 
formula could be a better measure of ownership concentration because it represents the 
amount of shares owned by individual investors and large blockholders. Therefore, we 
replicate the estimations in Table 3 by using excess control. The results in Table 4 reconfirm 
the existence of a nonlinear relationship between excess control and R&D investments, which 
is also moderated by family control. 
 
 
                                                          
2 Readers are requested to refer to footnote 1 for the definition of critical control level. 
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Table 4: 2SLS non-linear regression results – excess control (N = 14,573) 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
Stage 1/DV = EC  
Stage 2/DV = R&D 
Variable Estimate t-stat  Estimate t-stat 
Intercept 1.0184  74.13***  -2.1626 -7.85*** 
EC    3.4531  7.17*** 
ECxFamC    -2.1049  -3.83*** 
EC2    -1.2562  -5.94*** 
EC2xFamC    0.9768  4.11*** 
FamC 0.0679  28.77***  1.0764  3.39*** 
Control variables Yes  Yes 
Fixed effects Yes  Yes 
Adj. R2 0.1513  0.2613 
Note: EC = Ownership – critical control level in percentage + 1, whereby ownership indicates the sum of 
percentage of direct and indirect shares held by the ultimate controlling shareholders. *, **, and *** denote the 
significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Fixed effects include year and industry. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
By using the 2SLS regression method, we show that a nonlinear inverted U-shaped 
relationship exists between ownership concentration and R&D investments. This implies that 
ownership concentration influences a firm’s R&D investments, and thus, this effect should be 
highlighted in innovation improvements. Our analyses suggest that shareholders with 
concentrated ownership increase their R&D investments up to a critical point. However, after 
the critical point, R&D investments decrease with an increase in ownership concentration 
owing to risk aversion. Moreover, the two abovementioned relationships are moderated by 
family control.  
 
Overall, this study has broad implications for literature on this topic. First, this study shows 
that the relationship between ownership concentration and R&D investments is nonlinear. 
Furthermore, this study provides empirical evidence that family control may not always entail 
low levels of R&D investments, as compared to other types of companies. In addition, the 
findings suggest that investors may consider investing in firms with family involvement 
because family-controlled firms consider the firms as their long-term belongings for several 
generations and seek long-term profit maximization. 
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